Tariffs are shifting. De minimis rules are under pressure. And new enforcement could change how retailers operate overnight. If you sell across borders—through ecommerce, marketplaces, or direct—these changes don’t just impact compliance. They impact your pricing, margins, and conversion rates.

Register for our Trade and Tariff webinar series for regular updates.

Everyone wanted the GLP-1 retail story to be a grocery apocalypse. It wasn't.

The numbers that scared CPG back in 2021 turned out to be real but small. Cornell and Numerator found that households with a GLP-1 user cut grocery spending an average of 5.3% in the first six months, with higher-income households dropping more than 8%. That's a dent, not a collapse. Circana's read is sharper anyway: those households still outspend the average non-user household, they just buy different things. Wine down 12%. Dried meat snacks down 17%. Beans, rice, and gum up. The basket is reshuffling, not zeroing out.

The analyst projections are where it gets loud. JPMorgan floated a $30B – $55B annual revenue hit to food and beverage by 2030–2034, built on assumptions of 21% fewer calories and 31% less grocery spend per user. Worth flagging that's a model resting on usage growth that hasn't happened yet, not a measured result. Gallup puts current weight-loss GLP-1 use around 12% of adults. Circana thinks GLP-1 households reach 35% of food and beverage units by 2030. Maybe. Generics and cheaper oral pills could get there. They also might not.

The food fight misses the real move. The money isn't in defending the cereal aisle. It's in owning the prescription.

Watch where the two biggest players actually went. Amazon built a full GLP-1 program through One Medical: screening, prescription, monitoring, and pharmacy delivery in one stack. Cash-pay oral from $149 a month, injectables from $299, same-day delivery in roughly 3,000 cities heading to 4,500 by year-end. Walmart took the opposite path to the same goal, bundling LillyDirect pricing on Zepbound, telehealth partners, and pickup across its 4,600 pharmacies while Walgreens and CVS shrink.

Call it what it is: a monthly subscription that pulls a customer into your ecosystem every single month, with built-in reasons to bolt on nutrition coaching, protein-forward food, fitness, and refills. A GLP-1 patient juggles a clinician, a pharmacy, and an insurer, usually badly. Whoever collapses that mess into one recurring relationship captures a high-frequency, high-loyalty customer for years.

So the category implication runs opposite to the doom thesis. So the doom thesis has it backward. The demand doesn't vanish; it changes departments. It leaves the Doritos bag and reappears as...nd reappears as a monthly prescription, a protein reformulation, a wellness bundle. The grocers that own pharmacies, Walmart and Costco and Kroger and Albertsons, were never going to lose. They just move the customer from one department to another and bill both ends.

Apparel is the one category where GLP-1 plainly adds demand, with analysts cited by CNBC pegging the wardrobe-refresh tailwind at $3B to $13B a year (an estimate, not a measured figure). But a customer who drops a clothing size a month orders three sizes, keeps one, and ships the rest back, and Narvar told the Wall Street Journal that size-down exchanges hit 14.6% of apparel exchanges in 2025, so whether anyone banks that demand depends on not letting the returns line swallow it.

The losers are the brands with no health story and no pharmacy counter. A pure-play snack company watching its core buyer eat 700 fewer calories a day, with nothing GLP-1-adjacent to sell and no prescription to monetize, has a genuine problem. ConAgra slapping a GLP-1 friendly label on 26 frozen meals is a start. It is not a strategy.

The open question for anyone covering this: does the recurring-prescription model actually throw off the adjacent spending the investor decks promise, or does it just turn Amazon and Walmart into low-margin pharmacies with extra steps? Convince me the bundle holds. I haven't seen the attach rate yet.

ASICS is carving Onitsuka Tiger out into its own company, OT Group, effective January 1, 2027. The board approved the split last week. The brand stays inside the ASICS family as a wholly owned subsidiary but gets its own Tokyo headquarters, its own CEO, and the freedom to move faster. That's the press-release version.

Here's what the numbers say. Onitsuka Tiger's first-quarter net sales rose 34% year-on-year to ¥37.8B, about $236M. ASICS shares are up roughly 20% so far in 2026. When one product line grows that fast inside a larger company, the parent eventually decides it moves quicker on its own leash. This is that decision.

What ASICS won't say plainly: it fumbled the U.S. once already. Onitsuka Tiger pulled out of North America in November 2023 after its Japanese executives and ASICS America couldn't agree on whether the brand was performance footwear or a luxury label. Now it's heading back in 2027, structurally separated from the people it fought with.

You don't give a unit its own CEO and its own balance sheet unless an IPO is still on the table.

So: real strategy, or a tidier org chart? Convince me.

Most parent companies bury a hot sub-brand inside the org until the growth stalls; ASICS is doing the opposite, cutting Onitsuka Tiger loose while it's running 34% quarterly, so it can move at its own speed. The real tell is the 2027 U.S. re-entry: the brand left North America in 2023 over an internal fight about whether it was performance gear or luxury, and a separate company with its own CEO settles that fight by structure rather than memo.

If this works, expect more footwear and apparel groups to spin out their fashion-leaning lines instead of forcing them to share a P&L with the running-shoe business.

Thursday, June 18